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1. Abstract 
A lot of time and effort is spent by governments and car manufacturers in improving road 
safety. The gained safety however is never as high as expected due to the effect of risk 
compensation of the driver. G.J.S. Wilde proposed his controversial risk homeostasis theory 
to explain this effect. In this paper we aim to find the effect of risk compensation in a 
controlled environment and whether this effect indeed does follow the principle of Wilde’s 
risk homeostasis theory. For our research we created a videogame designed to measure risk-
taking behavior in which participants were asked to fly a spaceship trough a meteor shower. 
For risk-taking behavior, we measured the time to collision every 0.1 seconds between the 
spaceship and the closest meteor in its collision course. 178 participants played this 
videogame five times, each with different amounts of shields which deplete with every 
collision with a meteor. Our hypothesis was that participants would increase their risk-taking 
behavior linearly if the amount of protection was linearly increased as well. We found 
positive results in our between condition analysis (F (1, 162) = 11.152, p =.001, η2=.064) but 
not in the within condition analysis. We posed several reasons for this difference and 
conclude that we did find the effect of risk compensation. A follow-up study is necessary in 
which the amount of risk-taking is quantifiable to be able to address whether risk taking 
behavior follows a homeostatic pattern. Our other research question was whether participants 
would show less risk-taking behavior if they were made unaware of their protection. The 
results didn’t ratify this hypothesis but rather show an increase in risk-taking behavior with 
every shield depleted. We discuss whether this is due to effect of retrospective compensation. 
A follow-up study is necessary to further explore this effect. 
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2. Introduction 
In our lives we spent a lot of time traveling between destinations. Be it in a car from and to 
work, in a plane for a holiday or on a bike to the grocery store. The driver and other occupants of these 
vehicles encounter numerous situations which have a certain risk to them. For instance, driving on a 
crowded intersection or driving with broken car lights. However, the risk of the driver is not only 
based on the hazardousness of the environment but also on the behavior of the driver himself. He 
needs to evaluate the hazardousness of the environment and make adequate decisions and execute 
them based on the risks of the situations. Governments put a lot of effort in increasing the safety on the 
road. But in order for their safety measures to be successful it is crucial to understand the interaction 
between these measures and the processes underlying the behavior of the driver to truly be able to 
optimize the safety within traffic. In this paper I want to look into the way humans base their decisions 
on their risk assessment and test whether this effect can be reproduced in a controlled environment. 
2.1 Risk, safety and their interaction 
To further deepen the decision making with regards to risk it is necessary to define the words 
risk and safety. According to Hollnagel (2008) risk is the chance that an unwanted event will occur. It 
is however only called risk if the unwanted event is a result of human (in)action. If the chance on the 
unwanted event is either 100% and therefore unavoidable this is not considered to be a risk, because 
no human (in)action could possibly alter the outcome. The unwanted event is just considered to be a 
tragedy. Zero percent chance that an unwanted event will occur is called absolute safety, but since 
there are always at least slight chances that a specific unwanted event would occur zero percent is 
more theoretical. Therefore, calling something safe is subjective, because you always accept a certain 
amount of risk which can be different from person to person. Whether a person considers a situation to 
be safe is subject to different factors like personality and attitudes (Ulleberg & Rundmo, 2003) and 
mood (Wright & Bower, 1992). Even though people differ in their judgement of calling a situation 
safe, safety can objectively be increased. There are two ways of increasing the safety of a situation. 
Either you decrease the chance of the event from occurring (prevention) or you decrease the effect of 
the unwanted event making it less detrimental (protection). If we look at this in traffic, there are many 
examples of both prevention and protection. Anti-lock braking systems (ABS), for instance, decrease 
the chance of skidding through which the driver has a larger chance of preventing a crash. Other car 
features like seat belts and airbags protect the driver in case of an accident by decreasing the 
deadliness of a crashing incident. In a very direct way these features do ensure that risk is reduced and 
safety is increased. Traffic hazards that are predominantly caused by mechanical dysfunction or 
coinciding misfortunes leading to a tragedy are benefitting from these safety interventions  
RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR EXPLAINED THROUGH A VIDEOGAME  5 
2.2 Risk compensation 
These measures that reduce the risk should as a result reduce the amount of accidents in a 
direct way. However, the estimation of this reduction of accidents prior to the implementation is most 
often higher than the actual reduction after the implementation of the measures. This is due to an 
indirect effect of the safety measure on the behavior of the driver. This effect is called risk 
compensation. Risk compensation is the effect that people engage in more risk taking behavior after 
they become aware of the risk reduction in the environment (Dulisse, 1997). For instance, people with 
ABS in their cars compensate for this shortened braking distance by driving significantly faster and hit 
the brakes more aggressively than people without ABS (Grant & Smiley, 1993). This shows that an 
important influence on which a driver bases his decisions is his risk assessment of his situation. 
Multiple studies show that risk compensation has a diminishing effect on the decrease in accidents that 
safety measures should provide (Stetzer & Hofmann, 1996). However, at this point there is still a 
debate on the effect size of the risk compensation. On the most extreme end Peltzman (1975) proposed 
that the risk compensation is virtually complete. He suggests that safety features in cars do not 
produce a net increase in safety, because drivers compensate for the full amount of safety they are 
provided with. This risk compensating behavior results in a total prevention of accident reduction in 
traffic. Although this effect is controversial, Wilde (1982a) proposed a model that builds upon this 
complete risk compensation, the Risk Homeostasis Theory (RHT) (Figure 1).   
Figure 1. An earlier and simplified version of the Risk Homeostasis Theory of Wilde (1982a).  
Within this model Wilde describes how people have a homeostatic balance of risk that they naturally 
accept. Homeostasis is a state in which the value always circulates. For instance, the blood sugar 
concentration in a human being. The actual value at any point in time can variate, but it always pivots 
around an average. In Wilde’s model he assumed that drivers compare their perceived level of risk 
with the level of risk they are willing to accept, the target level of risk. If their perceived level of risk is 
higher than their target level, they become more careful. For instance, they slow down or focus their 
attention more till they match their target level of risk. More intriguing is the hypothesis of this model 
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that people will also alter their behavior if their perceived level of risk is lower than their target level. 
When they have motives to engage in riskier behavior they will alter their behavior in favor to their 
benefits till they reach the target level of risk. Wilde concludes that every person has this target level 
of risk that they are willing to expose themselves to in order to gain certain benefits. In other words, 
after a safety measure is implemented the perceived level of risk is lowered since a crash is less likely 
to occur or the driver is more effectively protected. The driver notices this decrease in risk and 
increases his risk taking behavior for example by speeding to match his target level of risk. . After a 
new safety measure is implemented it takes some time before drivers will realize how much safety a 
certain intervention provides. Therefore, right after the implementation of the safety measure drivers 
won’t alter their behavior yet which results in an accident loss. After a while drivers start taking the 
added safety of the measurement into the equation. This risk compensation effect leads to an increase 
of accidents. This results in the fact that the accident rate will first decline and slowly rise again after 
drivers start compensating for it.  
Wilde (1982a) states that risk compensation always occurs unless the intervention aims at lowering the 
target level of risk people are willing to expose themselves to. This can be achieved if the intervention 
has at least one of four factors to lower the target level of risk and are therefore successful in reducing 
the accident rate. These factors are:  
1. decreasing the benefits of risk taking behavior 
2.  increasing the benefits of safe behavior 
3. decreasing the costs of safe behavior 
4. increasing the costs of risk taking behavior  
For instance, Bolderdijk, Knockaert, Steg and Verhoef (2011) conducted a study in which they 
included the factor of increased benefits of safe behavior. Their study revealed the effects of Pay-As-
You-Drive vehicle insurances which decreased the target level of risk. In their study a group of young 
drivers was followed during one year in which they would have to pay a smaller monthly insurance 
fee if they didn’t exceed the speed limit. They found that participants with this insurance were a lot 
less guilty of speeding than participants that did not have this increased benefit of safe behavior. On 
the other hand, safety measures that do not include at least one of these factors do show a risk 
compensation. For instance, obligating drivers to wear seat belts does not include one of these factors. 
Contrarily even, it decreases the costs of risk taking behavior, because the driver is better protected in 
case of an accident (Chorba, Reinfurt & Hulka, 1987). This decreases his perceived level of risk 
without altering his target risk and thus he can engage in more risk taking behavior. Because the seat 
belt is a measure of risk protection, the severity of the incident for the driver is lower, resulting in less 
deaths and serious injuries for the driver. However, people not directly affected by the law, being 
pedestrians, cyclists, and rear seat occupants, did not have this extra protection which resulted in more 
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deaths of all these groups (Harvey & Durbin, 1986). This is fully in line with the Wilde’s RHT 
because even though there is a shift in the people affected, the net amount of people who are seriously 
injured or killed remains the same. In conclusion Wilde suggests that unless the safety measure 
motivates drivers to drive safer thereby lowering the target level of risk, drivers will compensate their 
behavior enough so the effect of the safety measure nullifies. This would mean that a lot of assets and 
effort that are put into road safety are wasted in the long run.  
2.3 Problems with Risk Homeostasis Theory 
After Wilde proposed his theory in 1982 it received a lot of critique. Firstly, because Evans 
(1986) showed that the death rates per capita steadily declined from 1943-1972 in the US and from 
1966 – 1983 in Japan). According to Evans if the Risk Homeostasis Theory is correct it is fair to 
assume that the death rates per capita would be constant throughout the years. We could assume this 
because the target level of risk of the population remains constant and therefore people would 
presumably engage in a matching amount of risk taking behavior. This would lead to the suggestion 
that an equal amount of casualties will follow. This does however not match with the decline found 
with the aggregated accident data analysis of Evans of both the US and Japan. This is no hard 
evidence to refute the RHT, because as we clarified in section 1.1 risk is the chance that an unwanted 
event would occur. Evans made a crucial mistake by comparing a specific unwanted event, being 
fatalities, not unwanted events in general, from this time period. Safety interventions like seat belts 
and airbags could indeed change the severity of the crash from being a fatal to being a non-fatal crash 
for the driver. However even if there is a decrease in fatal accidents this does not mean that there is no 
compensation for the safety measure. In the case of laws for mandatory seat belt usage, the 
compensation happened in the way that there is a greater increase in the total amount of crashes even 
though there is a decrease in fatal crashes (Harvey & Durbin, 1986). Here we come to a problem with 
discussing the RHT. Wilde (1988) states that the total sum of the accidents, not fatalities, will remain 
same if the target level of risk is unaffected. He clarifies that preventing a single fatality through safety 
measures could result in a compensating effect in which non-fatal crashes increase with more than 
one. This means that you should take severity into account as a weight of the type of accident. 
However, it is arbitrary to weight a single fatal crash against multiple non-fatal crashes (Hoyes & 
Glendon, 1993). This makes it impossible to verify RHT because you cannot objectively measure 
accident loss. The complexity does not stop here however. Both Evans (1986) and Wilde (1982b) 
measured only accidents. Even weighted accidents are not the only unwanted events drivers base their 
risk taking behavior on either. For instance, the chance of receiving a fine and the amount of the fine is 
another aspect of the target level of risk that participants want to match. Having to weigh all these 
components to analyze fluctuations in the level of risk in traffic is impossible. However, it can show 
us why a lot of research only shows partial risk compensation rather than a homeostatic effect. If a 
safety intervention decreases the perceived risk on the severity of the injury for the driver it does not 
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decrease the risk of receiving a speed ticket. Therefore, the risk of crashing cannot be compensated for 
as much as the protection provides. To illustrate this, let us put fictional weights to the target level of 
risk and perceived level of risk to get a better understanding of this (Table 1).  
A fictional safety measure of the future explicitly reduces the risk of crashing by 0.5 % and of severe 
crashing by 0.05 % while keeping the risk of other unwanted events the same resulting in a total 
perceived level of risk of 6.45 % instead of 7.0 %. Drivers can compensate for this particular safety 
measure by speeding. Wilde suggests that accident loss would remain the same and thus that speeding 
would occur till the combination of risk of crashing and of injury would be the same as before the 
measure. But speeding also increases the risk of receiving a fine. To fully match the total perceived 
level of risk with the target level of risk simply cannot lead to the same risk of an accident as before 
the measure. Analyzing purely the aggregated accident data it seems acceptable to refute RHT since 
the 0.95 % percent post implementation is only a partial compensation of the 1.2 % accident risk prior 
to the implementation. However, it would be incorrect to say RHT is falsified since you analyze only a 
portion of the total perceived risk. Being able to measure the total perceived level of risk is vital to be 
able to verify or falsify RHT which is unachievable in the real world.  
Table 1 
 
Another problem that we face when trying to verify RHT in the real world we can find in the RHT 
model itself. If we look back at the RHT of Figure 1 on page 4 we see that the accident rate is box e 
rather than box b. Adams (1988) points out that “We cannot measure risk directly. We identify a 
person with a high target level of risk by his high level of accidents, and we explain his high level of 
accidents by his high target level of risk”. He states that because of this we should not use empirical 
evidence to try to verify or falsify RHT, but that RHT is a metaphysical concept pregnant with insight. 
Even if we find a way to measure the total rate of unwanted events (the content of box e), we are 
Risk compensation with fictional risk percentages 
Risk types Prior to measure Post measure 
without 
compensation 
Post measure with 
crashing risk 
compensation 
Post measure 
with total risk 
compensation 
Risk of crash  1.0 % 0.5 % 0.9 % 0.75 % 
Risk of severe crash  0.2 % 0.15 % 0.3 % 0.2 % 
Risk of penalty 5.0 % 5.0 % 5.8 % 5.15 % 
Risk of others 0.8 % 0.8 % 1.0 % 0.9 % 
Total accident risk 1.2 % 0.65% 1.2 % 0.95 % 
Total perceived risk 7.0 % 6.45 % 8.0 % 7.0 % 
Target risk 7.0 % 7.0 % 7.0 % 7.0 % 
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faulty of circular reasoning. Comparing the rate of total unwanted events a priori and post hoc and 
claiming that this is due to a change in risk taking behavior is again difficult to verify or falsify and at 
least not empirical. Claiming that this difference is only due to risk taking behavior is impossible to 
hold on to. For instance, people who drive in cars with ABS, with improved acceleration and other car 
safety features could very well and most likely be other people than people with cars that do not have 
these features. This creates moderating variables in the form of personality, social-economic status etc. 
Crandall & Graham (1984) tried to combine all factors that would describe the risk drivers put 
themselves into, but it is infeasible to make a list that is mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive. Therefore, we need a controlled environment in which we can ensure to measure a single 
variable for risk taking behavior, box b, rather than its resulting unwanted event of box e. Another 
moderating variable that influences accident loss is governmental laws. Not only drivers compensate 
for increases in road safety other parties do so as well. For instance, The Dutch government increased 
the maximum driving speed from 100 to 120 km/h in 1988 (Roszbach & Blokpoel, 1989) and to 130 
km/h in 2012 (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2011) through which they accept an 
increase in the risk drivers put themselves and others in. Of course drivers could neglect these higher 
speed limits and drive purely based on their target level of risk, but the fact that the government 
declares it to be safe to drive faster on the road will most likely influence the perception of the driver 
as well. 
Multiple studies tried to use a controlled environment by taking out the real life experience 
and making use of simulations so they can measure the actual driving behavior rather than any 
resulting accidents (Jackson & Black, 1994) (Glendon, Hoyesm Haigney & Taylor, 1996). However, a 
lot of these studies use driving simulations. Wilde (1988) already claimed that compensating for non-
motivational measures could take a year or even more. This could be explained by the fact that a lot of 
driving a vehicle, like any skill, is largely based upon implicit procedural memory (Gray, 2007 p. 
335). Procedural memory is resistant to the interference of new information (Korman, Flash, & Karni, 
2005). This means that the driving behavior is largely based on their accustomed driving behavior and 
will be less influenced by new variables used in driving simulations. This makes testing difference in 
behavior with driving simulations more difficult, because these studies don’t have this amount of time 
for the adaption of the drivers’ behavior to the altered situation. Therefore, it would be desirable to use 
a novel situation that does not resemble driving and thus that is not consolidated into the implicit 
memory of drivers so participants can’t fall back on their accustomed driving behavior.  
In conclusion the RHT is a theory that could explain the compensating behavior of people in risk 
taking situations. In uncontrolled environments it is impossible to validate this theory. In order to test 
whether the RHT-model is true we need three aspects to be present: 
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A. A controlled environment with a single unwanted event on which the perceived level of risk is 
based. 
B.  A measurable variable of risk-taking behavior itself rather than the consequential outcome in 
the form of the unwanted event.  
C. A novel situation so participants do not rely on their accustomed driving behavior. Otherwise 
the consolidated behavior mediates the risk compensation we try to find.  
2.4 Our solution: the present experiment 
To tackle the problems regarding the aggregated accident data analysis and simulations we 
created a study that aims to confirm the process of risk homeostasis as proposed by Wilde (1982a) in a 
controlled experiment. If we can ensure that we measure risk compensation with the present 
experiment, we can attempt to measure how much compensation takes place for the safety measure we 
include in future research. For this study we used a game that shows little similarity with driving and 
was created for earlier studies regarding risk compensation of which we rewrote almost all code to be 
able to test our own hypotheses (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. The Spacegame used for testing RHT. 
In this game you control a spaceship which flies through a meteor cloud. You have to avoid colliding 
with every meteor that comes at you by moving up and down. Apart from moving your spaceship to 
avoid meteors you can also increase the speed at which the meteors come towards you. This makes the 
game more difficult since you got less time to react before the meteors reach your spaceship. This 
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means you put yourself in a riskier situation. The reason for doing this is that you get points per 
second corresponding with the speed level of the meteors. The higher the speed the higher the points 
per second. For this experiment we will use a within-subject design. Participants will play the game 
several times, each with a different number of shields. Each shield provides protection for one 
collision and thus provides safety.  
Measuring perceived level of risk. With the setup we actualized both a controlled environment with 
only a single unwanted event, being collisions with meteors, and a situation that shows little 
resemblance with driving both visual as well as in the input that participants give. The last aspect that 
we need to ensure is that we will be measuring risk taking behavior. First we will discuss what we 
define to be risk taking behavior in our setup. Then we will elaborate how we will be measuring the 
risk taking behavior. 
Measuring the amount of risk a player is exposed too can be done in various ways. For 
instance, by measuring the amount of seconds till the ship collides with a meteor and either loses a 
shield or crashes. If a player shows a lot of risk taking behavior, he will collide sooner than if he 
shows safer behavior. However, this is hardly different from the measurements in the real world 
experience. The collision with a meteor is the result of the risk taking behavior, but should not be the 
measurement for the behavior itself. If we look back at Wilde’s RHT-model the collision with the 
meteor is to be placed in box e. This is the same box e that is used in aggregated accident data analysis 
while we want to measure box b. Furthermore, the collision with the fatal meteor does not provide us 
with any information about the risk taking behavior regarding the other meteors the player 
encountered. It is just a single value for every session and is sensitive to several misfortunes like focus 
loss by the player or a rather difficult section early in the game.  
Another option is to measure the average speed of the player. This is directly linked to risk 
taking behavior as the game gets more hazardous when the meteors come towards you faster and thus 
is correlated with the likeliness of the collision with a meteor. With this as the risk taking variable it 
also does not matter if you collide with a meteor early in the session, because the average speed is 
independent of the duration of the session. However, the game is not increasing in difficulty over the 
course of a session so players should be able to manage parts later on just as easily as those at the start 
of the session. Therefore, my estimation is that people will not likely change their speed till they lose a 
shield. They could decrease their speed to avoid collision, however it feels less intuitive than just 
dodging to the top or bottom. Overall it seems most likely that people would change up to a speed they 
feel comfortable in and maybe increase or decrease it a little to get at their desired speed. This means 
that the average speed during a session is largely based on a single value per shield: the speed the 
player is comfortable with. Using the average speed also has the problem of losing a lot of the data 
since it doesn’t give any information about the evasion of meteors or how much distance the player is 
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able to keep between himself and the meteors. Combining these two variables of time before death and 
average speed gives us another option: “the distance travelled before death.” This variable however is 
also the result of risk taking behavior and is located in box e rather than box b. Above all, all these 
variables do not consider the meteors the player did not collide with, while all of these meteors pose 
an equal treat for the player. This is the same as in the real world. The risk that we crash into a vehicle 
is not only present in the vehicle we actually crash into, but this risk is present in every encounter with 
a vehicle. Therefore, we need to measure risk for all the meteors we encounter.  
Since the meteors fly in a straight line this means that the only meteors that are encountered 
are the ones in collision course of the ship. A large array of meteors at the top of the screen while the 
ship is at the bottom is no threat, while a single meteor in the collision course needs player interaction 
to be evaded. To be able to measure risk taking with every encountered meteor we decided to measure 
risk taking behavior using the time to collision (TTC) with the meteors that are in the collision course 
of the spaceship. In our experiment TTC is the time it takes for a meteor in the collision course to 
collide with the spaceship. TTC has been proven to be a successful measurement used in other risk 
related studies (Hoffman & Mortimer, 1994; Leung & Starmer, 2005), and with TTC we base the 
average of the risk taking behavior on a lot more data, namely all meteors that get into the collision 
course of the ship during a session. Even though a player successfully evaded these meteors his 
behavior is more risky the nearer he misses a meteor. This is even a more reliant variable than speed. 
Because while you can fly at a constant speed your focus could fluctuate resulting in a smaller TTC. 
So while you are getting more likely to collide with a meteor the measured speed does not indicate this 
while the TTC does.  
To see whether we conduct a study that aims to ratify the RHT, it is important that we are able 
to fit the study within the RHT-model (Figure 3).  
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As discussed earlier the resulting accident rate in this game is the chance of crashing into 
meteors (box e). Furthermore, the perceived level of risk is based on the TTC with the last few 
meteors. Combined with the number of shields (box f) this is compared with the target level of risk of 
crashing (box a). If the perceived level of risk is too high the player will want to decrease his speed. If 
it is too low, he will want to increase his speed (box c). He will then act accordingly (box d). To 
ensure that people are interested in scoring as much points as possible they were told that the player 
with the highest score at the end of the experiment would receive an extra reward, being 25 euro or a 
lottery ticket. For both risky and safe behavior there are benefits and costs (box 1). The benefits and 
costs for safe behavior is the opposite of risky behavior: having less chance of winning but also having 
less chance of ending the game prematurely. With this setup we actually measure box b, the perceived 
level of risk and compare this to the target level of risk and the number of shields.  
Now that we have deducted that TTC is the factor that corresponds with the perceived level of 
risk we need to find a way to measure the TTC with the meteors. In order to calculate the TTC during 
the game we automatically log the information necessary every 0.1 second of the time participants 
play the game which we wrote down in an excel file. Testing revealed that using an interval of less 
than 0.1 seconds for logging resulted in a latency in the processing of the input of the player and of the 
resulting output on the screen. The variables that were logged were:  
a. the amount of time that had passed from the start 
b. the speed level of the meteors 
c. the score 
d. the current amount of shields 
e. the location of the ship on the y-axis  
f. the location of the closest meteor in the collision course on the x- and y-axis  
g. some variables used for studies conducted by fellow students  
Figure 3. The RHT of Wilde (1982a) filled in with the variables of the current experiment. 
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The coordinates of all objects are based on the pixel grid of the game and the origin of the grid is the 
upper left pixel of the window. For all objects in the game the upper left pixel of their rectangular 
hitboxes is used to log their x- and y-coordinates. Because the spaceship is not able to move on the 
horizontal plane its x-axis coordinate is fixed which is at the position 109 and thus does not have to be 
logged. A meteor is considered to be in the collision course if it would collide with the spaceship if no 
input would be given by the player. A simple script in the game checks if a meteor is in the collision 
course of the ship so no unnecessary meteor positions would be logged. Figure 4 shows the collision 
course of the ship with an orange box. This detection of meteors in the collision course is performed 
by checking if the y-coordinate of the meteor (Ymeteor) is within the collision course of the ship. For the 
upper bound of the range we take the y-coordinate of the ship (Yship) and subtract the length of the 
meteor object of 60 pixels. For the lower bound we take the Yship and add the length of the ship object 
of 40 pixels. In our example the collision course is everything between y-coordinates 181 and 281. 
This means that the left meteor with Ymeteor = 203 is within the collision course while the right meteor 
with Ymeteor = 168 is not. If two meteors are within the collision course the meteor closest to the ship is 
logged. The collision course is only ahead of the ship. So meteors that are behind the ship are never 
detected to be in its collision course and thus never logged.  
Figure 4. The collision course of the ship. Shown with an orange box. The green dot in the upper left corner 
depictures the origin of the pixel grid [0, 0]. The red dots show the pixel within the meteor object on which the 
Xmeteor and Ymeteor are based. The blue dot shows the pixel within the ship object on which the Xship and Yship are 
based.  
After we have detected the closest meteor in the collision course the TTC can be calculated 
using the formula:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
  
In this formula distance is the distance between the meteor and the ship in pixels. Speed is the speed of the 
meteors in pixels per seconds and TTC is the time to collision in seconds. In our game we can calculate the 
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distance between the meteor and the spaceship by taking the x-coordinate of the meteor in the collision 
course (Xmeteor). This is the amount of pixels the meteor is away from the left border of the screen. The 
position of the ship on the x-axis (Xship) is fixed at position 109 and the length of the spaceship is 90 pixels. 
This means the meteor would collide if it were at position 199 on the x-axis. Filling this into the TTC 
formula we get:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =  𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 199
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
 
For the speed of the meteors we log the speed level directly from the game which can be calculated 
into speed with the following formula: 
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 270 + (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∗ 50) 
In this formula difficulty is a value between 1 and 13. The lowest difficulty has a speed of 320 pixels 
per second. Combining the formulae, we can calculate the TTC:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =  𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 199270 + (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ∗ 50) 
Let us look at an example which is shown in Figure 5. First the game checks if the meteor is in 
the collision course of the ship by checking whether Ymeteor is within the range of Yship – 60 and Yship + 
40. In our example Yship = 388 and Ymeteor = 359. Ymeteor is within the range of 328 and 428 and 
therefore is detected to be in the collision course. At the top right the speed level is presented which is 
only visible in the debug mode of the game. With the formula for speed we can tell with which speed 
the meteor travels towards the spaceship: 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  270 +  ( 3 ∗  50) =  420 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥./𝑑𝑑. Furthermore we 
can calculate the distance between the meteor and the spaceship by subtracting (109 + 90) from the x-
coordinate of the meteor: 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  269 − 199 =  70 𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥. To calculate the TTC we then divide 
the distance by the speed: 70
420
 =   1
6
 𝑑𝑑 ≈  0.167 𝑑𝑑. Thus after 1
6
 seconds the meteor will crash into the 
spaceship unless the participant maneuvers the spaceship out of the range of the collision course. To 
keep the required processing power of the hardware to a minimum we only logged the necessary 
information to calculate the TTC afterwards instead of letting the game calculate the TTC every 0.1 
seconds during gameplay.  
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Figure 5. An example of measuring TTC using a screenshot of the game. The colored dots show the pixel logged 
for each object with the coordinates above them.  
Concluding what we have defined to be the perceived level of risk and shown a valid way to measure 
the TTC we can relate this to RHT. With the current equipment we cannot prove that risk 
compensation is a homeostatic effect. For that we needed to find out how to quantify the increase of 
risk taking behavior with an increase in TTC. For instance, we cannot simply assume that twice the 
amount of time before collision is also twice as safe. This however lays beyond the scope of our 
experiment and our equipment. What we can however measure is whether a linear increase in 
protection leads to a linear increase in risk taking behavior. This leads to our first hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: If people do compensate for the safety they are provided with by comparing their target 
level of risk, they will engage in more risk taking behavior in conditions in which they have more 
protection. In our experiment this will mean that: 
a) participants have lower TTC averages in conditions with more shields, 
b) participants have lower TTC averages within a single condition at the times that they 
have more shields left, 
c) across all conditions participants have lower TTC averages at times that they have more 
shields left, 
d) when the protection decreases linearly the TTC will increase linearly and there is thus a 
negative linear relationship between protection and TTC. 
Another important premise for people to compare their perceived level of risk with their target 
level of risk is that they are aware of the amount of safety the environment provides. Customers are 
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often made aware of the safety features by car salesmen and can estimate their amount of risk on these 
features. However, if you make it impossible for them to get an understanding of their perceived risk, 
they cannot match it to their target level of risk. In our game we can create this situation by making 
participants unaware of the amount of shields they start with. In that case participants cannot match 
their perceived level of risk with the target level of risk and have to base their behavior on something 
else. From the Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) we know that people weigh losses 
heavier than gains and people are generally risk aversive when making gains. In our experiment 
participants can only win a prize if they received the most points and do not receive a penalty for 
crashing their ship other than decreasing the chance of winning. By making them unaware of their 
perceived level of risk it is likely that they would be more risk aversive and want to ensure they 
receive points for a longer time than in a session in which they are made aware of their protection. 
This leads to our second hypothesis that we will explore in this article. 
Hypothesis 2: If participants are unable to match their perceived level of risk with their target level of 
risk they will show less risk taking behavior by having higher TTC’s when they are unware of their 
protection than if they are made aware.  
We will be using a within-subject design for our experiment. This means that every participant will 
play the game several times with different amount of shields. Before the actual sessions the 
participants will have a training section so they will have a basic understanding of the game and their 
input options. This training block will also diminish the learning effect between the different trails. 
Furthermore, we will randomize the order of the amount of shields between subjects to further account 
for the learning effect. 
In order for us to accept our hypotheses we need to verify two other premises. First, we need to ensure 
that we measured TTC successfully. Because TTC is partially based on the speed of the meteors, but 
the speed values do not alter as much as the TTC, the average speed is a good variable to ensure that 
there are no computing or logging errors in the TTC measurements. We also want to verify if there is 
no significant difference between performance in earlier and later sessions, in order to rule out 
possible lurking variables. 
a) In order to verify that TTC is measured successfully, all its results at least corresponds on 
an ordinal scale with the results based on the average speed. Since higher speeds are 
correlates with higher risk, a higher speed corresponds with a lower TTC.  
b) In order to rule out other factors that could influence the performance throughout the 
experiment,  we will analyze whether there are significant changes either in speed or time 
spent per shield between earlier and later sessions.  
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3. Methods 
3.1 Participants 
The total number of participants was 178. 131 were female and 47 male. The participants 
either got paid for their participation or received credits which are mandatory for psychology students. 
The participant with the highest score received either a larger monetary reward or a lottery ticket of the 
same value, between which he could choose. 
3.2 Stimuli 
The game used in this study was made using the free version of GameMaker 8.1. The game 
was made to be displayed full screen at a resolution of 800 x 600 pixels. On screens larger than this 
the imagery stretches out but keeps its proportions intact so that it does not influence the gameplay. In 
the current game the character of the player is a white spaceship which was located on the left of the 
screen at 109 pixels from the left border of the screen (Figure 6). During the course of the game 
meteors came towards you from the right side of the screen. They appeared at a random position on 
the y-axis and flew in a straight horizontal line towards the left of the screen. There was a constant 
horizontal distance between each two meteors of 155 pixels. You can control the spaceship by going 
up and down to prevent colliding with the meteors. The object of the spaceship had a size of 90 x 40 
pixels and the object of the meteor was 60 x 60 pixels. These were also their collision boxes. The 
background of the game was an imagery of a city at nighttime which also moved from side of the 
Figure 6. Spacegame with an overlay of the dimensions and spatial locations of objects. 
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screen to the left to create the illusion that the ship was the object that moved rather than the meteors. 
Apart from the up and down movement the player was also able to adjust the speed level between 1 
and 13 which changed the speed of the meteors. At speed level 1 the meteors had a speed of 320 pixels 
per second. Each next speed level added 50 pixels per second on top of that resulting in a maximum 
speed of 920 pixels per second at level 13. The player could increase the speed level with the right 
arrow key and decrease it with the left arrow key. The difficulty changed with 1 level every 250 
milliseconds when the corresponding key was pressed. This allowed players to hold down the button 
to quickly get to a much higher speed level or press the button to go up only 1 level. The speed level 
was not shown to the participant. 
Furthermore, the ship had a number of shields. Every time the ship collided with a meteor a 
shield depleted from their ship and the spaceship was invulnerable for 1 second. This invulnerability 
was necessary because a lot of the time a collision with the very next meteor was unavoidable which is 
detrimental for the data analysis. After all shields were depleted the next collision became fatal, 
resulting in an animation of the ship crashing and after which the game ends. The amount of shields 
the spaceship had was written at the upper left corner of the screen and also represented with shield 
icons right below it. The other way the game could end was if the player managed to prevent the ship 
from crashing for 4 minutes. This was necessary because otherwise players could play the game 
endlessly on the lowest speed level and always end up with a higher score than people who would play 
riskier if they were patient enough. 
3.3 Apparatus 
The game and questionnaires for my colleagues’ research were presented on a LCD-monitor 
with a resolution of 1024 x 768 and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The game was made to support 100 frames 
per second but due to the refresh rate of the monitor only 60 frames per second were presented.  
3.4 Procedure 
The tests were performed in a computer room in which 12 participants could engage in the 
experiment at the same time. The experiment was build up however in a way that participants 
experienced as little distraction as possible from each other. First, several questionnaires, which were 
used by my colleagues, were split up and presented before and after playing the game so that it was 
unlikely that there were participants still busy playing the game when others finished and left the 
room. Furthermore, the participants were positioned in a way that they were unable to look at the 
screen of other participants. Before the experiment a brief introduction was given about the different 
sections of the experiment and a small explanation of the game. After the first half of the 
questionnaires the experimenters started the game which showed the participants one of five different 
instructions, either with solely text or with a combination of text and video. The reason for this was 
that it was part of a research performed by another colleague. After this the participants played through 
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a practice round to understand the basics and the controls of the game. In the practice round the player 
either received 1 or 3 shields. This was randomly distributed among the participants. After the practice 
round the participants played through five rounds of the actual experiment. In four of the five rounds 
the participant knew the amount of shields he received which was either 0, 1, 3 or 5. Every amount of 
shields was dealt once. In the other round he was made unaware of the amount of shields which was 
always set to be on 3. The order in which the shields were dealt to the player was randomly presented 
in a Latin square order. This had to be done to control for the learning effect, since people could 
become better at the game during the experiment or lose focus towards the end. This order was 
randomly assigned to a participant so that there would be no difference by design between players who 
show up in the morning or in the afternoon. After all combinations were used some shield orders were 
used twice. The pool of sessions orders for this second round were handpicked in advance to fit a 
second round of the Latin square order as best as possible. 
3.5 Data analysis 
As we already explained in section 1.5 every 0.1 seconds the game automatically logged 
information necessary for the calculation of TTC. For testing the hypotheses described in the 
introduction we used the within-subject ANOVA. We will compare the averages of TTC and speed of 
the different conditions to see if participants will engage in more risk taking behavior in conditions 
with more protection than with less protection. We will do this in three ways. We compare the 
averages of the 5 different starting conditions with each other. We will also compare the averages of 
the different situations within the five conditions. Lastly, we will be comparing the averages of all 
situations throughout the different conditions where people have different amount of protection 
regardless of their starting condition. For instance, we will compare all situations in which participants 
have zero shields left with all situations in which people have one shield left. Our main variable that 
we will be focused on is TTC. However, we will be controlling for TTC with the speed averages. Not 
only because TTC is a dependent variable of the speed that the meteors travel at, but also since speed 
is closely related to the actions of the player. Whereas he controls the mean TTC through the up and 
down arrow key he controls his speed with the right and left arrow key.  
4. Results 
The results of 8 participants were excluded from analysis due to the following reasons:  
a. Two people reported having experienced problems with the game due to output latency.  
b. Furthermore, two people did not accelerate at all during the game. Afterwards one of them 
was asked for his reason and reported that he was unaware of the option to accelerate. 
RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR EXPLAINED THROUGH A VIDEOGAME  21 
c. Four participants rushed the game playing all five sessions within 90 seconds total. These 
people are considered to be wanting to finish the game as quick as possible to receive their 
participation reward.  
Of the remaining 170 123 were female and 47 were male. The age ranged from 18 to 57 years 
(M=22.3, SD=4.0). The results of the TTC averages are presented in Figure 7 and speed averages in 
Figure 8.  
Figure 7. The amount of shields left against the mean TTC. 
Figure 8. The amount of shields left against the mean speed.  
 
Before we analyze the data any further these results show us a problem with every first shield 
of every condition where TTC is significantly higher and speed is significantly lower than the rest of 
the shields in the session. This is due to the problem that the first several seconds there are no meteors 
yet nor can people alter their speed. This was necessary in order to keep a constant array of meteors 
with a constant distance between them on the screen. Furthermore, the game starts on the lowest speed 
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(320 pixels per second). Almost all participants adjusted their speed as soon as they could. However, 
to be able to give them control of their speed we programmed it in a way that the speed increase was 
never higher than 200 pixels per second squared. This results in additional seconds to get to the 
desired speed. These factors both lead to a lower average speed and a higher TTC for the first shield in 
every condition. Therefore, we need to take out the first shield in every condition. This results in the 
graphs presented in Figure 9 and 10.  
Figure 9. Correction of the amount of shields left against the mean TTC. 
Figure 10. Correction of the amount of shields left against the mean speed. 
When comparing the three different starting conditions in which the participant knew their protection 
(1,3 and 5 shields) repeated measures analysis show us a significant effect for TTC after a Huynh-
Feldt correction: F (2.77, 469.65) = 4.14, p<.01 partial η2=.03 (see Table 2). Within-Subjects 
Contrasts show there is a significant linear relationship between protection and TTC (F (1, 162) = 
11.15, p =.001, η2=.06). Plotting reveals it to be a negative relationship. 
When we compare the behavior between the amounts of protection within the 5, 3 and unknown 
shields condition we find only a significant effect in the unknown shield condition (F (2,280) = 5.486, 
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p<.01, η2=.002) (see Table 2). Within-Subjects Contrasts show that there is a linear relationship 
between TTC and protection left (F (1, 140) = 9.051, p>.01, η2 = .06) within the unknown shields 
condition. Plotting shows that this is a positive relationship. 
When we combine the data of the different conditions and compare the situations with different 
protection amounts left (i.e. zero, one or two shields) we find TTC not to be significant. Because the 
participants were unaware of the amount of shields they had left in the unknown shield condition these 
situations were left out of the analysis. 
There is also no significant difference between the three and the unknown condition. 
Table 2 
Within-Subjects Effects of amount of shields on risk taking behavior through TTC. 
     
Condition Test statistic df1 df2 sign. 
Effect 
size 
 
(F) 
  
(p) (η2) 
Between known shields + 6.45 1.94 314.08 <.01* .04 
      Within five shields + 1.29 3.43 449.21 .28 .01 
Within three shields + 0.32 1.83 270,11 .71 .00 
Within unknown shields 5.49 2,00 280,00 <.01* .04 
      
Between protections left + 0.74 1.858 520.353 0.47 .00 
Between three and unknown 
shields 0.20 1 162 .65 .01 
+ Huynh-Feldt correction. *significant at p <.01 
When we analyze the mean speeds of the different conditions and situations we see a lot of similarity 
with the mean TTC’s. Again comparing the different sessions, we find a significant difference 
between them (F 3, 480) = 4.13, p<.01, η2 = .03) (see Table 3). Within-Subjects Contrasts show there 
is a significant linear relationship between protection and speed as well (F (1, 162) = 11.38, p =.001, 
η2=.07). Plotting shows that this relationship is positive.  
Comparisons between different shield situations within the different conditions shows only a 
significance for the unknown shield condition similar to the TTC comparison. (F (1.66, 465.53) = 
15.60, p<0.001 η2=.10) (see Table 3). Within-Subjects Contrasts show that there is a linear 
relationship between speed and protection left (F (1, 140) = 18.597, p>.001, η2=.12). Plotting reveals 
that this is a negative relationship. 
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When comparing all situations with different protection amounts left (i.e. zero, one or two shields) of 
the different starting conditions combined we find speed not to be significantly different. Nor is there a 
significant difference between the three and the unknown shield condition. 
 
Table 3 
Within-Subjects Effects of amount of shields on risk taking behavior through speed. 
     
Condition Test statistic df1 df2 sign. 
Effect 
size 
 
(F) 
  
(p) (η2) 
Between known shields 6.18 2 324 <.01* .04 
      Within five shields + 0.88 1.96 261.30 .48 .01 
Within three shields ++ 1.27 1.65 243.73 .28 .01 
Within unknown shields + 15.60 1.46 204.94 <.001* .10 
      
Between protection left ++ 0.01 1.66 465.53 .87 .00 
Between three and unknown 
shields 0.02 1 162 .89 .00 
+Greenhouse-Geisser correction ++Huynh-Feldt correction * significant at p<0.01 
Furthermore, we analyzed the time spent per shield between the four sessions in which participants 
knew their shield amounts to see if our analysis of TTC and speed also matches participants’ behavior 
in time spent per shield. Analysis of the between conditions data show that there is a significant 
difference in time spent per shield (F (1.75, 181.53) = 7.88, p<0.001, η2=.07). Within subject contrasts 
and plots show that there is a negative linear relationship between amount of shields and amount of 
time per shield (F (1, 104) = 18.12, p<.001, η2=.15). However, this analysis is problematic since there 
is a maximum amount of time per session, being four minutes. This means that sessions in which 
participants reach this endpoint with five shields get an average of 40 seconds. Meanwhile in the zero 
shield conditions this would be 240 seconds. This resulted in a polarized difference between 
conditions. Therefore, we had to take out the participants that did reach the end in any condition. We 
had to take them out of every single session however otherwise we would not be comparing the same 
groups with each other. This means that we had to take out more than one third of our participants at 
which point our analysis strongly diminishes in value. This also means that analysis of distance 
traveled per shield and scores per shield would have a lot less value since these derive from time.  
However, we can use time spent per shield as well as speed to see if there is any difference in behavior 
between earlier played sessions and later sessions leaving data of all participants in. We can leave all 
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participants in since the order of conditions is randomized and thus the four-minute limit is not an 
issue. For this analysis apart from speed I used time spent. Both are useful to analyze whether a strong 
learning effect is present in the data, since people can either speed up in later sessions or play longer if 
they become more skilled at the game. Since the sessions are randomized we need to consider the 
amount of time spent per shield rather than time per session, since participants have different sessions 
to be their last. We found however no significant difference in time between earlier and later sessions 
(F (3.67, 377.49) = 0.28, p= .88) nor in the average speed between sessions (F (2.55, 407.85) =0.79, 
p=.48).  
5. Discussion 
In this study two hypotheses were tested. The first being that participants would compensate 
for the safety of the shields and thus engage in more risk taking behavior when they had more shields. 
The second hypothesis was that people would engage in less risk taking behavior if they are unable to 
match their perceived level of risk. First we will address the results and their relation to the hypotheses 
before looking at the interpretation of them for both hypotheses individually. 
First of all, if we compare the results in which TTC is the dependent variable to those with 
speed we see that the results are quite similar showing both significance only in the analysis of the 
between shield conditions and in the within condition analysis of unknown amounts of shields. 
Especially in the between shields analyses the results are virtually the same. The other results show 
however less comparison in their F, p as well as η2 values, but still follow the same order on the 
ordinal scale. It is not surprising that the results follow roughly the same trend since speed is a variable 
on which TTC is based. However, while the differences did not result in any alteration in our 
conclusions the differences do show the importance of using TTC as the variable to base risk taking 
behavior on rather than speed in future research. Also time spent per shield in the different conditions 
follows the same linear trend of that of TTC and speed, showing higher amounts of time when 
participants have less shields at the start of the session. It derives from logic however that playing on a 
lower speed also shows higher amounts of time per shield since it is easier to avoid collisions on lower 
speeds. 
If we look at the four conditions after we take out the first shields we see that there is a 
negative linear relationship between amount of protection and TTC. Thus a linear increase in 
protection results in a linear increase in TTC. This result confirms the hypothesis that people do 
compensate for the amount of protection they are provided with as described by Wildes’ RHT and that 
the game is able to measure this effect. However, if we look at the amount of protection during a 
session we find no significant difference in TTC for both the three and five shield condition which is 
not in line with the hypothesis. Also if we combine the data of all conditions and compare the different 
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amounts of protection left we see no decrease in risk taking behavior. If we look at the results used for 
the second hypothesis that people would engage in less risk taking behavior if they are unaware of 
their risk, we conclude that the results of the unknown shield condition does not support the 
hypothesis. It was even found that participants went significantly faster after losing protection in 
specifically the unknown shield condition. This means that on top of the falsification of the hypothesis 
these results seem to be in contrast to our predictions based on RHT.  
5.1 Risk compensation with known protection 
In order to understand what could have caused the discrepancy between the analysis of the 
between condition results and the within condition results we will first zoom in on the experiment 
before relating it to RHT.  
 The first reason why we do not see the effect of RHT between the amounts of protection 
within a session could lay in the setup of the game. Unlike comparing the different conditions, 
analyzing the difference of behavior within a single condition we overlooked that there is a relation 
between having less protection and the amount of seconds played. This is caused by the fact that the 
amount of protection decreases during a session. Since a single session could last up to 4 minutes and 
thus the total time playing is 24 minutes this could result in boredom of the participants especially if it 
isn’t their first session. If participants became bored, they could speed up during the session which 
increased their chance of crashing and increased their TTC of the later shields of that session. Wright 
and Bower (1992) showed that mood effects risk-taking behavior. While boredom is not present in 
their study, it is likely that this has an effect on the perception of risk level. Afterwards I talked with 
some participants and three participants admitted that they accelerated during sessions because it took 
too long to reach the end. However, in our analysis of time spent per shield between earlier and later 
sessions we see no indication that participants spent less time per shield in later sessions.  
Another reason for this discrepancy in analyses that I found is that there are a lot of missing 
values. This occurred when a participant finished a session without crashing and with a certain amount 
of shields left. We can consider these participants to have played the game very safe. For the analyses 
of the difference in behavior between amounts of shields within a condition the results of these 
participants could not be used. They would increase the mean TTC of only the first few shields and 
would be of no influence of the last shields. If we left their results in the analysis this could nullify the 
decreasing risk taking behavior of the participants that spent all their shields. Because I left them out 
these analyses this created a sampling bias however. It results in a group of participants that took more 
risk than the total amount of participants and thus in a different group than the group of participants 
that were analyzed in the between conditions analysis. Since the group used in the within condition is 
a group with a higher level of risk taking this could be of influence of the within group results. 
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This last factor offers us an explanation why we do not find the effect of risk compensation in 
the within condition analysis and why we do find them in the between subject analysis. However, if 
this is not sufficiently influential we must consider that there is a theoretical basis for the discrepancy 
of the two analyses. This can be found if we look at the setup of the game. In our study we assumed 
that participants would reevaluate their new amount of protection and act accordingly, resulting in less 
risk taking behavior the less protection is left. However, participants become aware of their amount of 
shields at the start of a session. These shields give a hundred percent guarantee that their ship will not 
crash on the next collision. Since participants can simply fly on and have no penalty for losing a 
shield, losing a single shield can be considered not to be an unwanted event. Instead of reevaluating 
his new amount of protection every time the participant loses a shield he evaluated at the start of the 
game how much errors he is allowed to make. Only if these errors occurred at a time interval smaller 
than the participant is feeling comfortable with would he decrease his risk taking behavior. If this 
reasoning is true, the unwanted event would be a certain amount of crashes per second instead of 
crashes all together. This would explain why we see no lowering of risk taking when participants have 
less shields during a session. It also explains why we do see a lower amount of risk taking when 
participants start with less shields and thus in the between condition analysis. In other words, if the 
reasoning is true that participants acted solely on the starting amount of shields we have not been 
measuring risk compensation in the within condition analysis, since the amount of protection 
participants started with remained the same during the session.  
In conclusion we did find the risk compensation as described by the RHT of Wilde in the 
between condition analysis. The amount of risk taking steadily increased with the amount of 
protection. We do however not know whether this compensation is a complete compensation. For this 
to be examined we need a variable of risk taking that can describe the factor with which risk taking 
behavior increases and equipment to accurately measure this variable. While we did not find this effect 
in the within condition analysis, we reported several explanations why this effect was absent. 
Therefore, we conclude that both premises, being that the game is able to measure risk taking behavior 
and that participants compensate in accordance with the RHT-model, are ratified by the data. If we 
relate this result to reality we can conclude that risk compensation is an important factor in risk 
assessment. While we do not yet know if this leads to a risk homeostasis we ought to be cautious to 
say that traffic interventions that do not lower the target level of risk are futile. These interventions are 
still useful for situations unrelated to human risk behavior. Treat, Tumbas, McDonald, Shinar, Hume, 
Mayer, Stansifer, & Castellan (1979) show us that at the time 57 percent of all accidents in the US 
were solely due to human factors. If we considered all these to be mediated by risk compensation, that 
still leaves us with 43 percent in which either car dysfunction or environmental factors played a role. 
Dadashova, Arenas-Ramirez, Mira-McWilliams, & Aparicio-Izquierdo (2016) also explored the 
predictors of fatal road fatalities showing many large effects outside of the drivers behavior. 
RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR EXPLAINED THROUGH A VIDEOGAME  28 
Therefore, considering new safety interventions it is important to understand the effect of risk 
compensation. However, it is equally important to explore the occurrences in which the intervention is 
useful and independent of the risk assessment of the driver.  
5.2 Risk compensation with unknown protection 
The second hypothesis, stating that participants would engage in less risk taking behavior if 
they are unaware of the amount of protection, is not supported by the results and is even contradicted 
by them. We cannot find any reason within the setup of our experiment that could offer an explanation 
why the results are contradicting the hypothesis and thus we have to consider whether there is a 
theoretical understanding for the results. In our previous section we discussed how people could 
evaluate their protection at the start of the session and acted accordingly throughout the whole session. 
In the known shield conditions this offers a valid explanation for the invariable TTC. In the unknown 
shield condition however they did alter their TTC. This difference in behavior can be explained by a 
similar process of evaluation. While the participant is unaware at the start of the session how many 
shields he has, he evaluates throughout the session how many he has spent and thus how many he 
knows he started with. This causes a delayed evaluation of his risk assessment and results in an effect I 
call retrospective compensation. When we simply transmute the graph of figure 7 on page 21 with 
TTC averages from a graph oriented at shields left to a graph based on amount of shields spent we can 
see this retrospective compensation (Figure 11). 
Figure 11. The average TTC by the amount of shields spent rather than shields left. Every line is a single 
condition. Be aware that the first shield of every condition, which we dropped for analysis, is in this graph since 
they are still useful for the discussion of retrospective compensation. 
Comparing the TTC before the first shield is depleted in the different conditions we can see 
that the average of the unknown condition is between the zero and the one shield condition. When we 
compare the second shield of the different conditions the unknown shields condition is around the one 
shield condition. After that there is little difference between the three shield condition and the 
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unknown shields condition. This pattern could be an indication that participants in this condition do 
not act as if every shield is their last shield, but that they take risks for the amount of shields they 
currently know they started with. For instance, after the participants used one shield they engage in 
risk taking behavior that corresponds with a one shield condition, because they know that the 
condition they are in has at least one shield. After they have used three shields they engage in behavior 
that fits the three shield condition. This can be seen as a retrospective compensation, because 
participants engage in riskier behavior not based on the amount of protection they guess they have left, 
but based on the amount they know to have spent (Figure 12).  
Figure 12. Simplified version of the retrospective compensation effect. For sake of clarity the average TTC for 
all known shield conditions is displayed as a constant. The graph for speed averages would be vertically 
mirrored, showing higher values for more shields and a positive slope for the averages of the unknown condition. 
However, if people compensated in retrospective this would mean that only the last shield of 
the unknown shield condition would match with its matching known shield condition and the total 
amount of risk taking would be lower. It would be a complete retrospective compensation if 
participants compensated for their earlier situation by showing more risk taking behavior than the 
currently matching known shield condition (Figure 13). If this double retrospective compensation is 
true, this would mean that the participants fully compensated for their initial unawareness of their 
perceived level of risk. Retrospective compensation works similar to what Wilde (1982a) describes as 
lagged feedback. At the start of a new safety measure people are unaware of the amount of safety they 
have, but as they become more aware of their safety they will engage in more risk taking behavior.  
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Figure 13. Simplified version of the double compensation. For the sake of clarity, the known shield conditions 
are again kept as a constant. 
Translating this result to reality this exact setup of the experiment offers a problem since there 
is a decrease in protection during the session. In the game this decrease in protection is related to the 
participant knowing that he could have taken more risk prior to the loss of the shield. On the other 
hand, in reality a decrease in safety offers no explanation for a driver to increase his risk taking 
behavior. However, when driving it is more likely that you become aware of the safety features 
without actually crashing and without a significant reduction in safety. Drivers will have to rely on 
their equipment from time to time and if they are uninformed of the safety their car provides, they will 
base their safety on passed experiences. Therefore, I would argue that making the driver unaware of 
the amount of safety his car provides him, would have a larger decrease in his risk taking behavior 
right after he bought the car but will decrease over time as he becomes more aware of its safety. How 
long it will take before there is no difference in risk taking behavior between people that are aware and 
unaware needs to be addressed in future research. 
5.3 Future research 
Knowing that we can successfully analyze risk compensation with the setup of a game it 
becomes increasingly interesting to investigate whether this risk compensation can be considered to be 
risk homeostasis or that it is only partial risk compensation. In order to do so it is necessary to find 
what difference in TTC can be considered to be twice the risk. It could be quite a struggle to 
accomplish this with TTC, because half the amount of TTC does not resemble twice the amount of 
risk. This is due to the fact that decision making is not the only action that takes place during an 
evasive move. The amount of time needed to evade a meteor is based on a whole action sequence that 
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participants go through for every meteor that is a possible threat (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14. Action sequence of the participant when a meteor comes into the collision course. The top bar shows 
the TTC which is logged every 0.1 seconds and the minimum TTC at the moment of a successful evasion.  
A participant first needs to identify that the meteor is in the collision course. If he successfully 
identifies the threat, he needs to make a decision on what action to perform. Then he needs to provide 
the corresponding input. Lastly the spaceship takes time to execute the corresponding output. During 
this action sequence there can be time consumed by reconsidering the decision made earlier which 
creates a new phase of providing the input and the animation of the spaceship. This reconsideration 
can happen during phase 2 till 4. The total time to execute the full action sequence needs to be smaller 
than the TTC at time 0 to successfully evade the meteor. Every part of this action sequence consumes 
a portion of the time. The amount of risk participants engage in can be described as the amount of time 
they allow themselves for errors and fluctuations in the action sequence. With the current setup we 
however do not measure this allowed error time. Instead we logged every 0.1 seconds how much time 
till C, disregarding the location in the action sequence. In addition, 0.1 seconds is not accurate enough 
if you want to quantify the risk taking behavior in TTC. At the maximum speed the meteor travels 920 
pixels per second. This means that the position of the meteor is logged every 92 pixels. This is quite a 
large interval and enough to evade the meteor, but whether the meteor is evaded at an actual distance 
of 1 pixel or a distance of 91 pixels is quite a difference.  
However, there is a method to accurately measure the TTC with the current equipment without 
having the problem of quantifying the additional time necessary for the complete action sequence to be 
twice as safe. Instead of logging all variables every tenth of a second, we would log every position of a 
meteor at the exact moment the ship leaves the collision course. This way we can make the game less 
performance demanding, since only a small computer script has to be checked rather than logging 
several variables to an external file. Additionally, we know the participant is at the end of the action 
sequence leaving only the allowed error time. With this setup we would not calculate the average TTC 
of a participant during a session but the average minimal TTC of all the encounters of the spaceship 
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and all meteors in its collision course. With such a setup the TTC’s can be a lot more accurate without 
having to upgrade the components of the computers used in the experiment. 
Apart from optimizing the way of measuring risk-taking behavior, it is crucial to optimize the data 
analysis of future research. For this to be achieved we need to ensure that all participants are in all 
conditions and do not suffer from boredom. This can both be accomplished by using a single shield in 
all conditions. These shields do not deplete once they are used but rather have a varying percentage of 
success of protecting the spaceship from crashing. This way participants are always in the condition of 
having a single shield. It also does not matter whether they crash or reach the end of the timer. On top 
of that, every collision with a meteor is an unwanted event rather than only the last collision. This 
keeps participants more engaged, since they are encouraged to make no mistakes directly from the 
start of the session and it offers a simpler variable for unwanted events, box e of the RHT model, 
namely any collision with a meteor. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion we can state that people do compensate for safety they experience linearly if 
they are provided with a linear amount of protection, which corresponds with the way that the RHT of 
Wilde describes. A follow-up study is necessary to address whether the factor with which risk-taking 
behavior increases corresponds with the factor of the increase in protection. If this is the case it would 
strongly advocate for the process described in the RHT. This would mean that governments should 
invest more in safety interventions that aim to lower the target level of risk. Of course we need to be 
aware that not all accidents are results of human error. Therefore other safety interventions can be 
beneficial for road safety for situations that are unrelated to risk taking behavior. However, their utility 
would diminish over time for situations in which risk assessment of the driver is required. 
Furthermore, we can state that if people are kept unaware about their safety they will initially show 
safe behavior and engage in more risk taking behavior the more aware they become of their initial 
safety. 
References: 
Adams, J. G. (1988). Risk Homeostasis and the Purpose of Safety Regulation. Ergonomics, 31(4), 407-428. 
Bolderdijk, J.W., Knockaert, J., Steg E.M., Verhoef, E.T.(2011). Effects of Pay-As-You-Drive Vehicle 
Insurance on Young Drivers’ Speed Choice: Results of a Dutch field experiment. Elsevier, 43, 1181-1186. 
Chorba, T.L., Reinfurt, D., Hulka, B.S. (1987). Efficacy of Mandatory Seat-belt use Legislation – The North 
Carolina Experience from 1983 through 1987. Journal of the America Medical Association, 260, 3593-3597. 
Crandall, R.W., Graham, J.D. (1984). Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting Behaviour: Some New 
Empirical Estimates. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 74(2), 328-331. 
Dadashova, B., Aernas-Ramirez, B., Mira-McWilliams, J., Aparicio-Izquierdo, F., (2016). Methodological 
Development for Selection of Significant Predictors Explaining Fatal Road Accidents. Accident Analysis and 
Prevention, 90, 82-94. 
RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR EXPLAINED THROUGH A VIDEOGAME  33 
Dulisse, B. (1997). Methodological Issues in Testing the Hypothesis of Risk Compensation. Accident Analysis 
and Prevention, 29(3), 285-292. 
Evans, L., (1986). Risk Homeostasis Theory and Traffic Accident Data. Risk Analysis, 6, 81-94. 
Grant, B., Smiley, A. (1993). Driver Response to Antilock Brakes. A Demonstration of Behavioural Adaptation. 
Proceedings of the Canadian Multidisciplinary Road Safety Coference VIII. Transport Canadam Ottawa, 
Ont., Canada. 
Gray, P., (2007). Psychology. Worth Publishers. New York. 
Harvey, A.C., Durbin, J. (1986). The Effects of Seat-belt Legislation on British Road Casualties – A Case-study 
in Structural Time-Series Modeling. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A-Statistics in Society, 
149, 187-227. 
Hoffmann, E. R., Mortimer, R. G. (1994). Drivers' Estimates of Time to Collision. Accident Analysis & 
Prevention, 26(4), 511-520. 
Hollnagel, E. (2008). Risk + barriers = safety? Safety Science, 46, 221–229. 
Korman, M., Flash, T., Karni, A. (2005). Resistance to Interference and the Emergence of Delayed Gains in 
Newly Acquired Procedural Memories: Synaptic and system consolidation? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
28(1), 74-75. 
Leung, S., Starmer, G. (2005). Gap Acceptance and Risk-taking by Young and Mature Drivers, both Sober and 
Alcohol-intoxicated, in a Simulated Driving Task. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 37(6), 1056-1065. 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. (2011). Landelijke uitrol snelheidsverhoging (Kamerstukken 
2010-2011, 32646 nr.1). The Hague: Dutch Government Printing Office. 
Peltzman, S. (1975). The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation. Journal of Political Economy, 83, 677-726. 
Roszbach, R., Blokpoel, A. (1989). Korte-termijn Veiligheidseffecten van de 100 en 120 km/uur Snelheids-
limieten op Rijkswegen. Leidschendam: Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid SWOV. 
Stetzer, A., Hofmann, D.A. (1996). Risk Compensation; Implications for Safety Interventions. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 66(1), 73-88. 
Treat, J.R., Tumbas, N.S., McDonald, S.T., Shinar, D., Hume, R.D., Mayer, R.E., Stansifer, R.L., Castellan, N.J. 
(1979). Tri-level Study of the Causes of Traffic Accidents. Executive Summary. Institute for Research in 
Public Safety: Bloomington. 
Ulleberg, P., Rundmo, T. (2003). Personality, Attitudes and Risk Perception as Predictors of Risky Driving 
Behaviour among Young Drivers. Safety science, 41(5), 427-443. 
Wilde, G. J. S. (1982a). The Theory of Risk Homeostasis: Implications for Safety and Health. Risk Analysis, 2, 
209-225. 
Wilde, G. J. S. (1988). Risk Homeostasis Theory and Traffic Accidents: Propositions, Deductions and 
Discussion of Dissension in Recent Reactions. Ergonomics, 31(4), 441-468. 
Wright, W. F., Bower, G. H. (1992). Mood Effects on Subjective Probability Assessment. Organizational 
behavior and human decision processes, 52(2), 276-291. 
 
